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ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY POLICY: 
SUBSIDIES VS R&D COOPERA TION 
1. Introduction 
The issue of technology policy in imperfectly competitive markets has received 
considerable attention both in the theoretical and applied literature. Several papers in the 
Industrial Organization literature discuss the relative merits of different policy instruments, 
such as R&D subsidies and the encouragement of cooperative R&D, in raising R&D output, 
finn profitability and social we\fare, e.g. see Kamien et al. (1992), Vonortas (1994), 
Hinloopen (1995) and Poyago-Theotoky (1995). In this paper we study a neglected aspect of 
technology policy, namely the adverse impact it might have on the environment through 
increased production when R&D expenditure leads to cost reduction. Although technology 
policy measures, such as e.g. R&D subsidies or the fonnation of Research Joint Ventures 
(RJVs), that encourage finns to reduce their production costs would usuaBy reduce energy 
inputs and therefore generate less poBution per unit of output production, we explore here the 
case where with reorganization of production output generally increases. So even if per unit 
of production pollution is les s, total pollution generated by the increased production which is 
induced by the innovative efforts of finns increases. In this context it is therefore necessary 
to address the issue of tying-in technology and environmental policy, which is the issue we 
raise in this paper. 
To motivate our point we mention a few examples that throw sorne light on the issue at 
hand. The oil refinery industry in Greece which is highly concentrated has enjoyed major 
gains in productive efficiency and has expanded output due, most probably, to technology 
policy measures encouraging innovation. At the same time there is no clear environmental 
policy to regulate this particular industry. The same is troe, to a lesser extent, for the Greek 
food industry. On the other hand, finns in the agriculture and the milking industry in Spain 
receive both national and EU aid, usually in the fonu of subsidies, to pro mote the use of 
efficient productive practices without a concurrent interest or policy measure for the 
environmental effect of these practices. Implementing these more efficient practices might 
have a considerable negative impact on the environment, e.g. use of pesticides, associated 
with a considerable increase in production. 
From the existing theoretical literature on technology policy note that Hinloopen 
(1995), when comparing R&D subsidies to R&D cooperation under deterministic innovation, 
comes to the conc\usion that, when these policies are implemented in isolation subsidising 
non-collusive R&D optimally is the more effective policy in raising R&D. Stenbacka and 
Tombak (1996) in a model with stochastic innovation show that RJV s yield lower research 
intensities in the absence of subsidies. Both papers find a positive optimal R&D subsidy in 
equilibrium but do not consider any environmental effect of R&D. Contributions from the 
environmental literature on strategic innovation consider the relative performance of taxes 
versus standards on abatement related R&D expenditure in the context of international trade, 
see e.g. Ulph (1994) and Ulph (1996), i.e. they examine the effect that environmental policy 
has on R&D. In contrast, we examine the opposite link, namely the effect that different 
technology policy instruments have on the environment. In the context of our model, which 
is presented in the next section, irrespective of whether technology policy takes the form of 
R&D subsidies or R&D cooperation, R&D would generally lead to increased pollution and 
thus a negative impact on the environment. As a consequence, policies that might be optimal 
in the absence of any concern for the environment cease to be so. We claim than not only is 
a comparison between policy instruments more delicate but, in addition, the optimal R&D 
subsidy might be negative (i.e. an R&D tax) depending on the extent of appropriability 
conditions and the degree of environmental consciousness. From our analysis, the need of a 
tying-in technology and environmental policy beco mes obvious. We propose a targeted 
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subsidy on R&D provided that a minimum amount of abatement is undertaken by finns and 
show that under this policy social welfare improves. 
In section 2 the model is presented and the non-cooperative R&D, and cooperative 
R&D (RJV with full infonnation-sharing) equilibria are derived. Further, the optimal R&D 
subsidy is obtained. Section 3 compares R&D subsidies and RJV s in case that environmental 
damages are taken into account. In section 4 we study and evaluate a particular fonn of 
tying-in policy. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2. Tbe model 
We consider a duopoly with finns producing a homogeneous good under constant 
retums to scale. There are no fixed costs. Unit costs can be reduced by R&D spending while 
one finn can benefit from the other finn's R&D, i.e. there are technological spillovers. We 
use a simple two stage game: in the first stage the two finns invest in cost-reducing R&D 
and in the second stage they compete in quantities. R&D is characterised by decreasing 
retums. We examine three different policy set-ups: non-cooperative R&D, where each firm 
selects its R&D to maximise own profit; cooperative R&D, where the two firms cooperate in 
the R&D stage only and at the same time share their R&D results fully (the spillover is set at 
its maximum value); subsidised R&D, where a social planner chooses the optimal subsidy 
for R&D and firms compete in both stages. Initially we consider the case where there is no 
concem for the environmental impact of cost-reducing innovation (this is captured in the 
welfare function) and compare this to the case where the social planner cares for the 
environment. 
Let demand for the product be linear, P = A - Q, where º = q I + q2' and unit costs of 
production constant, C¡, i = 1,2. Second stage Coumot profits per firm can be easily 
computed and are given by Te, = (1I9)(A - 2c¡ + Cj )2. In the first stage finns choose their 
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cost-reducing R&D expenditure. In addition, a finn can benefit from its rival's R&D through 
spillovers. Thus costs of production can be written as e, = a - z, - /Jz), i *" j, i, j = 1,2, z, is 
finn i's R&D output (i.e. cost reduction), PE [0,1] is the spillover rate, a < A and 
a > z, + /Jz). The cost of R&D is assumed convex, indicating decreasing retums in R&D, 
and given by e(z,) = ¡z; /2,r > 0, where r captures the re1ative effectiveness ofR&D. 
We consider three different set-ups concerning techno1ogy policy with respect to 
R&D: no po1icy, cooperative R&D and subsidised R&D. In what follows we shall 
characterise the subgarne perfect equilibrium in these three cases paying particular attention 
to the case where there is no concern for the environmental impact ofR&D. 
2.1 Non-cooperative R&D 
We keep the discussion in this section and the next brief as the analysis is very similar 
to O' Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Poyago-Theotoky (1995); see these papers for 
more detai1s. First-stage profits per firm are glven by 1f, = ir, - e(z,) , which after 
performing the relevant substitutions become 
/J " 1f, = (1/9)[0" + (2 - )z, + (2/3 -l)z)]- - «(Z,-) / 2 (1) 
where O" = A - a > 0, is a measure of market size. The necessary first-order condition for 
the maximization of (1) is 
(2/9)[ O" + (2 - /J)z¡ + (2/J - l)z) ](2 - /3) - (Z, = ° (2) 
while the second order and stability conditions require r > 8/9 and r> 12/9 respective1y. 
1 We shall need to impose a stricter condition on r. see section 2.3. p. 
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From (2) we can solve for the equilibrium values of R&D output; in the symmetric 
equilibrium z, = z) = z, where z is given by 
CY 
Z = --,--::-----
45y -(1+j3) 
2-f3 
while equilibrium R&D expenditure is 
Y 2(2- j3)CY 
[ ]
2 
c(z) ="2 9y - 2(2 - j3)(1 + f3) 
(3) 
(3a) 
Next, we can easily compute equilibrium profit per firm and total equilibrium output: 
ycy2 [9y - 2(2 _ j3)2] 
1r=--:"'-"::'-:'-'---'---'-':"-"--=-:-
, [9y - 2(2 - j3)(1 + f3)f ' 
0= 6yCY 
9, - 2(2 - j3)(1 + f3) 
To model the effect that R&D has on the environment we postulate that production 
generates harmful emissions so that the more output is being produced the higher the damage 
to the environment.2 We use a very simple functional form to capture this: E = lQ, where 
E stands for emissions and A.>O is the emissions-output ratio and the damage function is 
written as D = kE = klQ = uQ, k, u ~ O, u = kA. The parameter u captures the notion of 
environmental consciousness. Thus, environmental damage in this case would be 
D = u 6yCY . In the context of our mode 1, and irrespective of which form of 
9y - 2(2- j3)(1+ j3) 
technology policy we examine, R&D would gene rally lead to increased production and thus 
to a negative impact on the environment. 
2 This is an oversimplification given that in most countries there are regulations associated with pollution reducing 
activities. However, there regulations are not tied-in to the technology policy framework, especially when 
considering particular industries, or less developed countries. 
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As a measure of welfare we use the sum of consumer and producer surplus, given, in 
2 2 
this case, by ~c = AQ - Q2 /2 - 2)a - z, - fo)q, - (y / 2)''LZ,2 - D, which after 
;=1 /=1 
substituting for the equilibrium values becomes 
w = 4ya2 [9y - (2 - f3)2] _ 6yau 
nc [9y - 2(2 - f3)(1 + f3)]2 9y - 2(2 - f3)(1 + f3) (4) 
Notice that when u = 0, there is no concern for the environmental impact of R&D; this 
is the general case looked at by the literature on R&D. It is evident from (4) that when the 
effects of simple cost-reducing R&D are taken into account there is a clear reduction in 
welfare, an aspect which has been largely overlooked in discussions on technology policy. In 
the following n,vo sections we examine in more detail n,vo popular forms of R&D policy: 
R&D cooperation and R&D subsidies and point out the differences that emerge when one 
takes into account the environmental impact of R&D. 
2.2 Cooperative R&D 
Here technology policy takes form of encouraging R&D by allowing firms to 
cooperate at the R&D stage.3 In the context of our model, R&D cooperation mean s that 
firms set their R&D cooperatively to maximise joint first-stage profits while competing in the 
second stage, i.e. we consider a Research Joint Venture (RJV). Moreover, we as sume that 
within the RJV there is full information sharing of research results or, equivalently, that the 
spillover is set at its maximal value.4 We keep the exposition brief as the model presented 
3 On R&D cooperation see. e.g. Jacquemin (1988), Kamien. Mueller and Zang (1992), Poyago·Theotoky (1995) 
and Vonortas (1994). 
4 The majority of papers on R&D cooperation make this assumption on the spillover in the RJV; e.g. see Beath et. 
al (1997). Note that this choice can be justified if one treats the spillover as a choice variable suitably 
reinterpreted as disclosure rateo lt can be shown that it is optimal for an RJV to set p= 1. 
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here is very similar to the one used by Poyago-Theotoky (1995) (with n = 2) and refer the 
reader to that paper. 
In the first stage the objective function ofthe RJV is written as 
2 2 
TI = (1/9)¿<a+z, +Z)2 - (y /2)¿Z,2 . (5) 
,=1 ,=1 
The first order conditions for the maximization of (5) are éfI / Oz, = 0= éfI / Oz,.5 
Solving for the symmetric equilibrium, z¡ = z, = Zc we obtain 
4a 
Z =---
e 9y-8 
with associated equilibriurn R&D expenditure per finn 
c(zJ = (7 /2)[ 4a ]2 
97 -8 
(6) 
(6a) 
Given the syrnmetric solution, it seerns reasonable to assurne an equal split of profits, 
so that equilibriurn profit per finn and total output are 
, 
ya-
tr = -'---
e 9y - 8 
and o = 6ya 
_c 9y - 8· 
Noting that the darnage function is in this case, D = 6yau / (9y - 8), we find the 
relevant express ion for social welfare 
w = 4ya2 (9y - 2) _ 6yau 
c (9y - 8)2 (9y - 8) (7) 
Again, relative to the case when there is no environrnental concern, u = 0, there is a 
decrease in welfare when u > O. We provide a detailed welfare cornparison together with 
sorne preliminary policy conclusions in section 3, after the discussion of the R&D 
subsidization case. 
5 The second order condition is satisfied. 
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2.3 R&D Subsidies 
Here technology policy takes the fonn of subsidising R&D expenditure but without 
allowing R&D cooperation.6 In the first stage finns compete in R&D while at the same time 
receiving a subsidy, s, on their R&D costs. Thus, the R&D cost function becomes 
C(Z,) = (1- s)(y / 2)Z;2, -00::; s::; 1.7 First stage profits per firm can be wrinen as 
tri = (119)[0- + (2 - f3)z, + (213 - 1)z)]2 - (1- s)(y /2)Z,2 (8) 
with associated first-order condition given by 
(2/9)[0- + (2 - f3)z, + (213 - l)z) ](2 - 13) - (1- s);Z, = O. (9) 
From (9) we solve for the symmetric equilibrium R&D output8, z¡ =z)= Zs 
20-(2 - 13) 
z = ----.-:----'~---
s 9y(1- s) - 2(2 - ,B)(l + jJ) (lO) 
and equilibrium R&D expenditure, 
/2 20"(2 - f3) 
[ ]
2 
c(z,) = (y ) 9y(1- s) - 2(2 - f3)(l + 13) (lOa) 
In line with the two previous sections, equilibrium profits and total production are 
given by 
o = 6y(1- s)o-
-s 9y(1- s) - 2(2 - f3)(1 +,B) 
6 See Hinloopen (1995) and Stenbacka and Tombal< (1996) for a related analysis. 
7 Notice that we allow for a negative subsidy, i.e. a tax on R&D. As will become c1ear latero depending on the 
value of spillover it might be optimal to tax R&D when there is concem for its environmental effects. 
8 Second order and stability conditions are checked to be satisfied. 
Given equilibrium output, we can easily compute the pollution level and the associated 
damage as Ds = 6y(1- s)au / [9y(1- s) - 2(2 - fl)(l + fl)] and using this we obtain 
welfare, for a given level of subsidy(tax) s: 
w = 4y0"2[9y(1-s)2 _(2_,8)2] -u 6y(1-s)0" 
-' [9y(l- s) - 2(2 - fl)(l + fl)]2 [9y(1- s) - 2(2 - fl)(l + fl)] (11 ) 
In order to compare welfare levels in the three regimes, we need to solve for the 
optimal subsidy that a social planner would choose. Maximising (11) with respect to s yields 
the following expression for the optimal subsidy/tax: 
A -18flyO" + u(2fl3 - 6fl - 4) + 9yu( 1 + fl) s = _-.:-.:..---.:.....:.-..-.....!...._-.:....._.:..-.:.--~ 
3y(l + fl)(3u - 40") (12) 
which for u = O beco mes 
A 3fl 
s = . 
u=o 2(1 + fl) (l2a) 
It is obvious from (12a) that su=o ~ O; in the presence of spillovers R&D should be 
subsidised and the optimal subsidy is increasing as the spillover in creases, and does not 
depend on the size of the market, O; or the effectiveness of R&D, Y. Note al so that 
Su=0 E [0,0.75] for fl E [0,1). This result is intuitively clear; as the spillover increases firms 
face diminished R&D incentives and the subsidy is a way of restoring these incentives. 
We then proceed to examine in detail the optimal subsidy/tax when u > O. 
Differentiation of(12) W.r.t. u results in 
á 2(fl - 2)(9y - 4fl2 - 8fl - 4)0" ° ifjfJ 4(1 + fl)1 
= < 1 y> 
óU 3(1 + f3)y(3u - 40")2 9 
so that in what follows we impose the sufficient restriction r > 16/9 to ensure the 
monotonicity of S. We can then state and prove the following proposition.9 
9 Al! proofs are in the Appendix. 
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Proposition 1. (i) When u = o the optimal subsidy is given by su=o = 313 with 
- 2(1 + 13) 
5u=0 = O for p = O and 1 > 5u: o > O for O < 13 ~ 1. 
(ti) For O < u < 40- /3, we have the Jol/owing: (a) when 13 = O, S < O, Le.· an 
R&D tax; (b) when 0<13:::;; 1, 5 ~ O if.f u:::;; u < 40- /3, i.e. an R&D subsidy, and 
s < O ifJ u < u, i.e. an R&D tax, where 18f3yo-u == . (value of u 
9y(l + 13) + (2[P - 613 - 4) 
such that a zero subsidy is optima/). 
(iii) The oprima! subsidy when u = O a/ways exceeds rhe optima! subsidy/tax when 
u > O, 5u=0 > S . 
In contrast to the literature on R&D subsidies, we identify conditions on the spillover 
rate and the environmental parameter, u, under which R&D should be taxed. A tax on R&D 
is optimal when the damage on the environment from increased production is quite 
substantiaLlO Figures 1 and 2 ilIustrate Proposition 1. 
[Insert figures 1 and 2 about here 1 
Notice also that the optimal subsidy/tax increases as the R&D cost function parameter, 
éS 2u(1 + 13)(2 - p) 
y, increases. From (12) we find that - =, > O, so that the more difficult 
Oy 3y- (3u - 40-) 
R&D becomes the higher the subsidy( or, the lower the tax) should be, for given u and 13. 11 
FinalIy, in order to compare welfare across the three cases meaningfulIy, we substitute 
the optimal subsidy as given by (12) into the express ion of welfare (11), to obtain 
10 Notice also that Proposition 1 identifies an upper bound on the value ofthe environmental parameter, u. 
11 Notice that in the particular case where -1 S s $ 1, a sufficient condition is u < 013. 
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w = 4y0-2 - 6you + U2 (l + ,8)2 
.f 9y - 4(1 + 13)2 (Ila) 
We next proceed to compare in sorne detail welfare in the three scenarios.12 
3. Welfare Comparisons 
Having discussed the conditions for an optimal subsidy/tax we are now in a position to 
examine the welfare consequences of the two policies and the no-policy optiono We then 
compare expressions (4), (7) and (IIa) both for u = O and u> O. At this point it is necessal)' 
to obtain conditions such that welfare in (4), (7) and (11 a) is non-negativeo We thus have the 
followingo 
Lemma 1. A sufficient condition for welfare to be non-negative is given by 
u ~ 20- / 3 o 
Note that this condition on u requires a lower upper bound than the one identified by 
Proposition 1; accordingly, in what follows we impose this latter restriction on Uo We then 
state the following proposition regarding welfare in the absence of environmental concemso 
Proposition 20 "fJ'hen u = O and y > 16/ 9 (i) ~ > w;,c for O ~ f3 ~ 1.. (ii) 
~. = W"Jor 13 = O and ~ > w"c for O < ,8 ~ 1 and (iii) W, ~ ~ for 13 ~,8 and W, < ~ 
for O ~ f3,P~ 1, and - (4-18y)+J2~567y2-414y+64 
,8= ~~_~ , where 
12 We do not provide a detailed comparison of R&D output, R&D expenditure and profit per firm for the three 
scenarios, as this lies outside the scope ofthis papero This can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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Parts (i) of Proposition 2 should be familiar from the R&D literature, see e.g. Kamien 
et al. (1992), giving support to the encouragement of cooperative R&D agreements where 
information is fully shared. Parts (ii) and (iii) though throw sorne new light on the 
technology policy debate. Thus, when either policy is implemented on its own, it is obvious 
that the non-cooperative scenario is the worst possible when technological spillovers are 
positive (see part (ii)). This is consistent with the negative effect of spillovers on firms' 
R&D incentives. R&D subsidies aim to restore firms incentives for R&D, innovation is 
induced, output and profit increases and, consequently, welfare rises relative to the non-
cooperative outcome. Part (iii) identifies conditions on the value of the spillover parameter 
such that welfare in the presence of R&D subsidies is higher (Iower) than welfare when there 
is an RJV.13 For spillover values below the critical value [3 an RJV results in higher 
welfare, whereas when the spillover is aboye the critical value the opposite holds. For 
relatively large spillover values (/3 > [3) when R&D is being subsidised, firms face a greater 
incentive to engage in cost-reducing innovation despite the fact that within the RJV the 
spillover is set at its maximal value; this result contrasts with those obtained by Hinloopen 
(1995) and Stenbacka and Tombak (1996).14 Figures 3-6 illustrate Proposition 2. 
[Insert Figures 3-6 about here] 
We now consider the relevant welfare comparisons in the case where production is 
1inked to pollution. Proposition 3 summarises our results. 
13 Notice also that éJ/3 / éJy > O, Le as the efficiency ofR&D de creases, R&D cooperation improves welfare 
relative to R&D subsidisation. 
14 Note though that Hinloopen (1995) uses a different specification for the subsidy function (subsidy per unit of 
R&D input), whereas Stenbacka and Tombak (1996) use the same R&D subsidy function but consider stochastic 
innovation. 
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Proposition 3. When O < u < 20" / 3 and r > 16/9 (i) w.. > w"c for O ~ f3 ~ 1.- (ii) 
f3 < p, where p == tBln-: = ~} and U == {ulp = 1} .- for U < u, ~ > ~ for O ~ f3 ~ 1. 
It is also useful to state the following corollary. 
= 
Corollary 1. f3 > fJ, i.e. the critical spillover sueh rhat w: = ~ inereases in the ease 
of environmental coneern, u > o. 
Part (i) of Proposition 3 is similar to Proposition 2 in the sense that here too 
cooperative R&D results in higher welfare relative to non-cooperation in R&D. Part (ii) is 
slightly different in that R&D subsidies lead to higher welfare compared to non-cooperative 
R&D for any value of technological spilIover. However, part (iii) is qualitatively different in 
that for relatively large values of u, u> u, R&D cooperation is always better than R&D 
subsidisation for any spillover value. For any other value of u, O < u < u, we obtain a result 
similar to proposition 2, i.e. there is a critical spillover value aboye which R&D subsidies are 
a better instrument than RJV s. Notice, that from CorolIary 1, this critical spilIover is greater 
than the equivalent spilIover in Proposition 2. Thus, the range of spilIovers for which R&D 
subsidies are better diminishes when polIution effects are taken into account. Figures 7 and 8 
ilIustrate Proposition 3. 
[lnsert figures 7 and 8 about here] 
4. Tying-in Environmental and Technology Policy 
In the light of our observation that social welfare decreases in the case when cost-
reducing innovation leads to increased polIution due to output expansion and the results 
contained in Proposition 3, it seems necessary to examine the way in which welfare can be 
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irnproved. We thus consider tying-in technology policy instrurnents with environrnental 
regulation/policy. 
We shalI propose one particular type of policy that ties-in concem for the environrnent 
in the form of a subsidy towards R&D only if firms spend a rninirnurn acceptable amount on 
abaternent. 
Let K (r,) = 8r/ /2 be the abaternent expenditure for firm i, i = 1,2, where r¡ is the 
reduction in per unit of output ernissions and 5 > O rneasures the effectiveness of the 
abaternent teehnology, i.e. by spending K(r) firm i redLCes its ernissions-output ratio, A, to ). 
- r" so that u = k(J.. - r,). Note that abaternent expwditure is an increasing and convex 
funetion of the per unit reduetion in ernissions but does not affeet in any way the costs of 
production of a firmo We propose the following poliey: A subsidv son R&D costs ifr, > r f . 15 
Otherwise. no subsidy, where re is the critical level of abaternent (to be defined later). The 
purpose of this poliey is to give incentives to cost-reducing innovation only as long as sorne 
rninirnurn necessary arnount is spent on abaternent. Under the proposed policy a firm faces 
the following cost structure in addition to the constant unit costs of production 
{
(l- S)(}ZI~ /2) + ¿;,~2 /2 if r, ~ re 
}Z; /2 otherwise 
(*) 
(13) 
We then state the following result whiá will be useful in discussing the optirnality and 
effeetiveness ofthe proposed tied-in poliey. 
Lemma 2. In the case of R&D subsidisation, social welfare is decreasing in u for 
u < 40- /3. 16 
15 The critical value re is derived later on. see p. 
16 Note that Lemma I imposes a stricter upper bound on u. u<2cr/3, so that welfare is decreasing in u for this 
bound also. 
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" mv mv~ mv As a result of Lemma 2, note that ~ / Cf'e > O because __ s = -_s - = _k __ of 
o-e ~a-e ~' 
where u = k(A. - rJ and it is implicitly assumed that a firm optimally chooses r¡ = re (this is 
- , óW mv 
checked later). Total welfare can be written as W = W - 6r- so that __ s = __ s - 2& 
.s s e ' ..-::l. """ e' 
CAe Cf'e 
with W, given by (lla). Notice that c::: ,<,O = '~l,o > O, SO that total welfare initially 
mcreases with re and the proposed policy is we!fare improving. Given that 
~~o OC 2(1 + /3)2 e > O, it follows that there is a critica! abatement level, re· > O, which 
Cf'e-
(l + /3)2 k 2 
maxirnises total welfare, w., if O is sufficiently high, i.e. 6 > 2 • 
9y -4(1+ /3) 
Under the proposed policy, as given by (13), firm i's decision considering its R&D 
expenditure, z" is described by expression (9) - see page 10, with the syrnmetric equilibrium, 
zs, given by expression (10). In the case where no subsidy is given the analysis of section 2.1 
carries through. However, in the case when (13) (*) is applicable, gross profits and output 
are as on page 11, with net profits being 7r s - 6r} /2 (where firm i optirnally chooses r, = 
re)' Tuming to the question offinding the critical abatement level, re, we proceed as follows. 
Define social welfare under the proposed policy as 
(14) 
where Ws is given by (11). The aim is to maximise (14) with respect to the subsidy rate, s, 
and the abaternent leve!, re' We proceed in two steps. Notice that, for a given re, the optirnal 
subsidy, s;, is given by expression (12) suitably reinterpreted, so the first step consisted in 
max w.. Next, we use the following 
s 
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(15) 
where W, is given from (11a) and we have used u = k(2 - rJ . The second step involves the 
rnaximisation of (15) with respect to re, yielding the optimal abatement level, re' 
r' = k(3ya-A.k(1+fJ)2) >0 
e 90y-(40+e)(1+fJ)2 . (16) 
Substituting re' into (15) we obtain 
w* = 022 k2 (1 + /3)2 - 60y2ka + ya2 (40 + k2 ) 
S 90Y _ (40 + k2 )(l + fJ)2 
(17) 
i.e. the rnaximal social welfare when both the subsidy and the abaternent level are chosen 
optirnally. We are thus in a position to state the following 
Proposition 4. In the case on non-cooperative R&D the optimal líe-in policy for 
welfare improvement takes the form "provide a subsidy s(rc') on R&D costs if r, 2: re'. 
otherwise provide no subsidy". 17 
The essence of proposition 4 consists In that it identifies a technology policy 
instrurnent In the form of an R&D subsidy that, In addition, aims to lmprove the 
environmental damage associated with the output expansion effect caused by cost-reducing 
R&D. Out analysis has shown that spending on R&D and obtaining a subsidy can have sorne 
beneficial side effects on the environrnent through firm's abatement activities. That is, the 
R&D subsidy can also help in pollution control without being targeted directly on abatement 
17 \Ve have assumed that the relevant participation constraint is satisfied, i.e. a firm has an incentive to undertake 
abatement and receive the R&D subsidy as its profits in this case exceed the profits from not receiving the subsidy 
and doing no abatement. lfthe participation constraint is not satisfied, i.e 1rs(r;)-&;2 /2<1r¡, in order to 
force firms undertake abatement a lump sum T can be given to restore incentives, 1rs(r;)-&;2 /2+T=1r" 
where ;r, is the equilibrium profit in the non-cooperative R&D scenario. 
16 
expenditure. The R&D subsidy can thus have a dual effect: to correct partly the R&D 
underinvestment problem - due to the market failure caused by the appropriability problem, 
and to encourage pollution control through abatement activities thus aiming at the market 
failure associated with the environmental problem. 
We should note here that an altemative tying-in policy could take the form of allowing 
R&D cooperation - in the absence of any R&D subsidies- only if abatement expenditures are 
undertaken. 18 This latter policy can be shown to improve welfare as well. However, it seems 
questionable whether such a policy can be easily enforced and/or monitored and is not 
pursued any further. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have studied a neglected aspect of technology policy resulting from 
the adverse impact that such policy might have on the environment through an output 
expansion effect due to finn' s innovative activities. In the limited context of our analysis, 
irrespective of whether technology policy takes the fonn of R&D subsidies or the 
encouragement of Research Joint Ventures (RJVs), R&D leads to increased pollution and 
thus a negative impact on the environment and a decrease in social welfare. As a result, 
policies that might have been optimal in the absence of any environmental effect cease to be 
so. In particular, we have identified conditions on the spillover and environmental 
parameters under which the optimal R&D subsidy becomes negative, i.e. an R&D tax is 
necessary when the damage on the environment is quite substantial. Comparing social 
welfare in the three different set-ups under consideration, i.e. non-cooperative R&D, pre-
competitive R&D cooperation and R&D subsidization, we find that such comparisons hinge 
on the relative magnitudes of the spillover rate and the environmental consciousness 
18 An analysis ofthis policy can be obtained from the authors upon request 
17 
parameter but it is always the case than the non-cooperative R&D set-up is thé worst 
outcome. In order to improve social welfare, we propose to tie-in technology and 
environmental policies. We have shown that the specific policy of using a targeted subsidy 
on R&D costs provided that a minimum critical amount of abatement is undertaken results in 
a c1ear improvement in social welfare. Moreover, the targeted R&D subsidy can be seen as 
having a dual effect: it corrects partly the R&D underinvestment problem and it encourages 
pollution control. 
Thl!re are a number of dimensions in which this research can be extended. First, one 
could consider a policy thatallows RJVs as long as a certain share ofthe R&D budget ofthe 
RJV is spent on abatement activities, in the absence of R&D subsidies. This opens up the 
possibility of R&D specialisation by the cooperating firms provided that information-sharing 
takes place within the RJV. This type of policy could induce complementary research 
projects which would benefit the RJV partners. Second, asymmetric or differential subsidies 
could be examined. For example, within an RJV, one of the partners could receive a subsidy 
on cost-reducing innovation while the other receives a subsidy on abatement. Of course, this 
latter option would entail coordination issues between the partners and might al so require a 
maximum of emissions imposed on each firmo 
18 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 
(i) Follows directly from (12a). 
(ii) We proceed in three steps. Step (l). Minimum technology spillover, p = o. 
~I u(9y - 4) O if.Jfj O 4a In this case, s = < 1 < U < -. 
u>o 3y(3u - 4a) 3 T osee why it is optimal to 
impose an R&D tax when u > O note the following: S < O if and only if u > u , given the 
monotonicity of s, where u = O when p == 0, and 3u - 40- < O; putting these together gives 
O < u < 40- / 3. On the contrary, S >0 if and only if u < u and 3u - 40- > O and it is 
immediately evident that these two inequalities are not compatible. Step (2). Maximum 
A 18y(u-0-)-8u 
technology spillover, p== 1. Here we have si o = . We shall show that the 
u> 6y(3u - 40-) 
optimal subsidy can be negative (i.e. a tax), positive or zero, depending on the value of the 
environmental parameter u. Thus sLo < O if and only if (a) u> Ul p=l' or 
u> 18yo-/(18y-8) and(b) 18y(u-0-)-8u>0 and 3u-40-<0. From(a)and(b)itis 
established that an R&D tax is optimal for Ul p=1 < u < 40- /3. Similarly, an R&D subsidy is 
optimal for u < Ul p=1 < 40- / 3, while a zero subsidy is chosen for u = z¡lp=1 < 40- /3. 1 Step 
(3). lntermediate technology spillover, ¡J E (0,1). Here we need to examine the behaviour of 
the optimal subsidy with respect to the spillover; we find 
é5S U(2¡J3 + 3/32 - 1) - 900-
=~~--~~~-----
o¡J 18(1 + ¡J)2 (3u - 40-) (Al) 
1 Given that y> 16/9, it is a1ways true that ü\P=1 < 40" 13. 
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As we have showed in steps (1) and (2), 3u - 40" < 0, so that é8 / éJ/3 > O if and only if 
• 2 u(2f3~ + 313 -1) - 900" < O. The latter is always true as long as 3u - 40" < 0, for any 
value of p. Thus a / éJf3 > ° for /3 E [0,1]. Combining with step (2) the result follows. 
(iii) Combining the result that a / éJfJ > ° with the findings in (i) and (ii) above, it 
is clear that the optimal subsidy/tax when u > O is always lower than the optimal subsidy 
when u = O for any value ofthe spillover. 
Notice that we have identified an upper bound on u, i.e. O < u < 4073. QED. 
Proof of Lemma 1 
From expression (4) we find that U::c ~ ° if and only if 
20"[9y - (2 - fJ)2] 
U :;; Taking the minimum value of the r.h.s. of this last inequality 
3[9y - 2(2 - f3)(l + ,B)] 
20"(9y - 4). . . 
with respect to p yields u::; , whlch reaches a mlOlmum as y ~ +00, or (9y - 4.5) 
. " 20"(9y -2) 
u :;; 20' / 3. From expressJOn (7) we have ~ ~ ° If and only If u :;; . The r.h.s. 
3(9y -8) 
of the latter inequality is minimised as y ~ +00 , or u::; 20' / 3. Finally, from (11) and 
(lla) note that W, ~ w,=o by the optimality of S. Given that éS < 0, w,=o ~ ° for all 
óU 
u::; 20' /3. Q.E.D. 
Proof of PropositioD 2 
(i) From (4) and (7) notice that 
9y - 2 9y - (2 - 13) 2 ~. > U::c => 2 > " or (9y - 8) [9y - 2(2 - fJ)(l + fJ)]-
9y -2 9y-l 
-'---::-, > 2' where (9y - 8)- (9y - 45) 
the r.h.s. of the latter inequality is the maximum value w.r.t. p of the r.h.s. of the former 
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inequality. It is then easy to establish that . [9r - 2 9r -1 ] 11m 2 / 2 = 1, so that for 
r-+-- (9r - 8) (9r - 45) 
[ 
9r -2 9r -1 ] 
any (admissible) value of r 2 / 2 > 1 . (9r - 8) (9r - 45) 
(ii) Using (4) and (lla) straightforward caIculations show that for P = 0, 
(jii) From (7) and (lla) we have ~ ~ ~ ifand only if 
8r(71 (l8/32 r + 36/3r - 45r - 4fJ2 - 8fJ - 28) .. . 
, , ~ O, whlch glves two solutlOns for p, one (9r - 8)- (9r - 4(1 + fJt) 
negative and one positive. Selecting the positive root, w:.. ~ ~ iff /3 ~ /3 and W, < ~ iff 
/3 < /3 , where p= (4-18r) +.fi~567y2 -414r +64 2(9y - 2) 
0</3<1. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
and 
(i) From (4) and (7) \Ve have ~c / éU < O and ~ / éU < O respectively. 
Proposition 2 establishes that ~Iu=o> w:,clu=o . From Lemma 1 we know that u < 2(7/3. To 
show that ~ > w:,c when u > ° it suffices to show that ~lu=2a-t3> w"clu=2aI3' Substituting 
'"' /3' d (7) W W 'f d I 'f 12[9y - 2(2 - fJ)(1 + fJ)]2 1 u = L.(7 m (4) an we have c> nc I an on y I > . fJ(2 - P)(9y - 8)2 
Taking the minimum value of the Lh.s. of the last inequality w.r.t. fJ we then have 
l2(9y - 4.5)2 
---'---20-'-- > 1. Taking the limit as y -+ +00 establishes that ~ > w"c' (9r -8) 
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(ii) From (4) and (lla) we obtain w.. > w"c if and only if 
(2fJ3u-6f3u+9fJyu+9yu-4u-18f3roY>0 Given that r>16/9 (byassumption) 
(9r + 2,82 - 2fJ - 4)2 [9y - 4(1 + ,8)2] . 
the last inequality is always positive and thus establishes the result. 
(iii) From (7) and (lla) we have w.. ;::: w:: if the following inequality holds 
4ya2 - 6rou + u\1 + fJ)2 4ya2 (9r - 2) - 6rou(9r - 8) 
~-_...!.-_--=-:----!"~>--=--":"""':'---'---'-:----''''''':''---'-
9y - 4(1 + ,8)2 - (9y - 8)2 (A2) 
This gives two solutions for j3 one of which is negative and thus is discarded. The positive 
solution is given by fJ;::: p where p == {f3j~ = W::} and p = f(u,r, a).2 It is possible 
= = = 
although tedious to show that fJ > O. It al so necessary that fJ ~ 1; setting fJ = 1 and solving 
for u gives two solutions, u¡ < 20- I 3 and ~ > 20- / 3, which is not acceptable as it violates 
Corollary l. We thus are left with 
54ya2 - 48yo- + 12 ~ y (9y - 16)(9y - 8) 2 a 2 
u = = u. If u> íl then f3 > 1 and (A2) 
¡ (9y-8)2 
cannot be satisfied, i.e. ~ > W, 'íI f3 E [0,1]. If u ~ íl it is obvious that (A2) is satisfied for 
= 
,8 ;::: fJ, while the opposite is true, i.e. w:: > W. for fJ < fJ . Q.E.D. 
Proof of Corollary 1 
= = To prove this it is sufficient to show that lirnfJ = fJ. From the expression for fJ 
u~o 
(see footnote 2) we have 
2 The exact solution is given by 
3270-2 - 144120-2 - 1 92you + 216120u - 64u2 + 144yu2 - 81y 2u2 
= +2J2~yo-(63yo-- 320-+ 48u- 54yu)(-32y0-2 + 144y 20-2 + 1 92you - 216y 2ou + 64u2 - 144yu2 + 81y 2u2 ) 
p= 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
-32yo-- + 144y-0-- + 192you-216y-ou+64u -144yu +81y u 
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limp = 4 -18y +F2~(9y -2)(63y -32) 
u-+o 2(9y - 2) 
which is the expression we have found for fJ. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 2 
Consider equation (lla) which gives social welfare when the optimal R&D subsidy 
is implemented. Differentiating with respect to u we obtain óW. oc -6ya + 2u(1 + fJ)2. It 
hU 
is then evident that aY: / hU < O if and only if 2W 1 + fJ) 2 < 6yO" for glven /3, or 
ar: / hU < O if and only if 8u < 6yO" for al! /3. Thus, given r > 16/9, the aboye condition 
becomes u < 40" / 3 . Q.E.D. 
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u = 0.3, y = 2.5 u = 0.66, Y = 2.5 
Figure 1: Optimal subsidy/tax (top line when u = O, bottom line when u > O), cr = 1. 
Optimal Subsidy when u > O Optimal Subsidy when u = O Comparison of optimal subsidies 
Figure 2: Optimal Subsidy/tax, (cr = 1, r = 2.5). 
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Figure 4: Welfare Comparison between W s and Wc• u = O. O :$ P :$ 1. 2.5 < y:$ 5. 
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Figure 5: Welfare Comparisons. u = O. 0:$ P :$ 1. 2.5 < y :$ 5. 
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Figure 7a: Welfare comparison: RJV vs R&D subsidies, u=O.3, cr = 1, U < U 
Note,: For definition of U see Proposition 3. 
1 
Figure 7b: Welfare comparison; RJV versus R&D subsidies, u=O.66, cr = 1 
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